

Abstract

In *Prolegomena* (1783), Kant makes a distinction between “Judgment of experience” and “Judgment of perception”. According to *Prolegomena*, the former is the judgment, which is objectively valid, but the latter is only subjectively valid. However, it seems that there is a contradiction between this distinction in *Prolegomena* and the use of “Judgment” in *Critique of pure reason* (1781/1787). This is because Kant doesn’t admit the same kind of judgment as judgment of perception. In addition, the concept “Judgment of perception” doesn’t appear in both editions of the first Critique. This means that this concept once appeared after the first edition, then disappeared before the second edition of the first Critique.

Many commentators have tried to solve this problem, and roughly speaking, there are two kinds of interpretation today. I call them “Vanity interpretation”, and “By-product interpretation”. Although they explain a lot about this problem, we cannot but have a feeling of unsatisfaction.

In my opinion, the unsatisfying point of interpretations above mentioned is that they conclude that “Judgment of perception” is just temporal for Kant, and finally eliminate it. But this (or very similar concept) appears in some other articles after the second edition of the first Critique, so I assert that this concept is not temporal, but permanent. In order to make the absence of this concept compatible with this permanence, I try to establish a new context in Kant’s epistemology, which is different from the context of the first Critique.